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‘Some unpleasant fiscal arithmetic’: the role of 
monetary and fiscal policy in public debt dynamics 
since the 1970s 
Bank of Finland Research 
Discussion Papers 28/2007 
Harri Hasko 




Shocks to monetary and fiscal policy have played a major role in public debt 
developments in the OECD countries since the mid-1970s. According to the 
applied VAR approach, these shocks, taken together, explained, on average, about 
half of the forecast error variation in the debt to GDP ratio, while the share of 
shocks to GDP growth was close to 30 percent. In contrast, shocks to inflation and 
the debt ratio itself played in most cases only a minor role. However, the inflation 
shocks were vital in initiating the public debt problems, as the increase in actual 
inflation, and particularly the persistence of high inflation expectations in the 
1980s, led to a prolonged period of high real interest rates. Learning the 
implications of greater monetary discipline therefore gave rise to ‘some 
unpleasant fiscal arithmetic’ which aggravated debt problems. In most countries 
fiscal policy aimed at correcting the deterioration in fiscal balances, but the 
progress was in most cases slow and delayed. It is noticeable that public debt 
developments have been quite similar in both the United States and the euro area 
despite differences in fiscal policy and the role of the public sector. Shocks to 
GDP growth, inflation and monetary policy, which have been more similar in both 
continents, explain about two thirds of the forecast error variation of the debt to 
GDP ratio, while shocks to fiscal policy explain about 20 percent. 
 
Keywords: public debt dynamics, fiscal policy, monetary policy, VAR models 
 
JEL classification numbers: E62, H62, C22  
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Raha- ja finanssipolitiikan rooli OECD-maiden 
julkisen velan kehityksessä vuosina 1960–2005 
Suomen Pankin keskustelualoitteita 28/2007 
Harri Hasko 




Raha- ja finanssipolitiikkasokit selittävät noin puolet ja BKT:n kasvuun kohdis-
tuneet sokit noin 30 % julkisen velan BKT-osuden odottamattomista vaihteluista 
OECD-maissa vuosina 1960–2005. Sen sijaan inflaatioon ja velan BKT-osuuteen 
itseensä kohdistuneet sokit selittivät vain pienen osan kehityksestä. Inflaatio-
sokeilla oli kuitenkin keskeinen merkitys julkisen velkaantumiskehityksen käyn-
nistymisessä. 1980-luvulla voimakkaana pysyneet inflaatio-odotukset nimittäin 
vaikuttivat siihen, että reaalikorot säilyivät pitkään korkealla tasolla, vaikka todel-
linen inflaatio rahapolitiikan kiristymisen myötä laantuikin. Korkeat reaalikorot 
kasvattivat velan hoitokustannuksia tuntuvasti ja muodostuivat siten keskeiseksi 
osaksi velkaongelmaa. Useimmissa OECD-maissa finanssipolitiikalla pyrittiin 
korjaamaan budjettitasapainoa, mutta edistyminen tässä oli usein hidasta. Julkinen 
velkaantuminen on ollut hyvin samankaltaista sekä Yhdysvalloissa että euro-
alueella, vaikka alueiden finanssipolitiikassa sekä julkisen sektorin roolissa on 
huomattavia eroja. BKT:n kasvuun, inflaatioon ja rahapolitiikkaan kohdistuneet 
sokit selittivät yhdessä noin kaksi kolmasosaa julkisen velan BKT-osuuden 
odottamattomista vaihteluista, kun finanssipolitiikkasokkien osuus oli vain noin 
20 %. 
 
Avainsanat: julkinen velkaantuminen, raha- ja finanssipolitiikka, VAR-mallit 
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What has caused the marked increase in the public debt to GDP ratios in almost 
all OECD-economies after the mid-1970s? Is it due to the behaviour of fiscal 
authorities or exogenous economic shocks that have come as a surprise to 
policymakers? What has been the role of monetary policy in these developments? 
If the high debt ratios are caused by a mixture of all these factors, what has been 
their relative importance? These questions have gained new significance in the 
context of the European Monetary Union (EMU) where national governments do 
not have recourse to debt monetization, which has historically been the ultimate 
contingency solution in debt crises. Neither can the governments expect a bailout 
by the European Central Bank, as this is forbidden by the Treaty. This makes 
guaranteeing fiscal solvency of utmost importance in the EMU. Moreover, the 
demographic developments are expected to put heavy pressure on public finances 
in most OECD countries in the coming decades, mostly in the form of increasing 
pension and health care costs. To face these challenges, the OECD countries have 
to be capable of managing their fiscal developments and secure the solvency of 
their public finances in the long run. 
  Because of the complexity of the factors that affect public debt dynamics, our 
knowledge of the relative roles of unforeseen economic shocks and discretionary 
monetary and fiscal policy in shaping the evolution of public debt ratios is rather 
limited. The political economy literature has extensively studied the influence of 
fiscal policy and particularly political institutions on the growth of public sector 
indebtedness (eg Roubini and Sachs, 1989a, Alesina and Perotti, 1995). Roubini 
and Sachs conclude that much of the rise in budget deficits could be explained by 
the slowdown in economic growth and rise in unemployment after 1973. 
Moreover, in countries with multi-party coalition governments (as in Belgium and 
Italy) it has been difficult to find consensus on fiscal consolidation. Alesina and 
Perotti find out that since the mid 1960s cyclically adjusted budget deficits have 
been mainly the result of increases in government spending and increased interest 
expenditures. Masson and Mussa (1995) describe the role of wider economic 
developments, including population, productivity growth and inflation. They see 
that the deterioration in fiscal balance sheets is mainly due to rapidly extending 
expenditures on public pensions and health care programs. However, the 
significant slowdown in economic growth and increase in structural 
unemployment have been important contributing factors. As regards the role of 
inflation, Masson and Mussa point out that, in contrast to previous periods, actual 
inflation ran somewhat below anticipated inflation in 1980 to 1994. Consequently, 
some of the rise in the real value of public debts reflected the surprise element in 
disinflation as suggested by the relatively high levels of ex post real interest rates 
in many countries during the 1980s. Nevertheless, while this literature provides  
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important evidence of the factors that have caused the high public debt levels, it 
has not tried to quantify the relative importance of these factors. 
  In this paper we apply a basic recursive, reduced form VAR model to seek 
tentative answers to the question, what have been the relative roles of unforeseen 
shocks to output, inflation, interest rates and the primary balance in public debt 
developments in selected OECD countries in the last three to four decades. 
Furthermore, we try to find out whether the response of fiscal policy to unforeseen 
economic shocks has been stabilising and to what extent monetary policy shocks 
have affected the fiscal outcomes. Although our focus is not in the structural 
identification of the VAR model, we discuss briefly how the model relates to 
common knowledge of key structural relationships. 
  The main conclusion of our study is that shocks to economic growth and 
monetary and fiscal policy have played a major role in public debt developments 
since the mid 1970s. Together these shocks explain, on average, about 80 per cent 
of the forecast error variation in the debt to GDP ratio while the average share of 
the policy shocks is more than 50 per cent. Instead, shocks to inflation and the 
debt ratio itself play in most cases a minor role. However, shocks to inflation were 
important in initiating the debt problems since the increase in actual inflation and 
particularly the persistence of high inflation expectations in the 1980s led to a 
prolonged period of high real interest rates. This raised significantly the interest 
burden of public debts. It seems that in most OECD countries fiscal policy aimed 
at correcting the deteriorating fiscal balances by improving the primary balance, 
but the progress was in most cases slow and delayed, particularly when taking into 
account the large magnitude of the increase in the interest burdens. Finally, the 
high persistence of the impact of policy shocks to the debt to GDP ratio has 
contributed to the seriousness of public debt problems. 
  The plan of the paper is the following: Section 2 gives a brief overview the 
relevant literature, Section 3 describes the variables and the data and the overall 
macroeconomic background for the public debt dynamics since the mid 1970s. 
Section 4 reports the results of the impulse response functions and variance 
decompositions of the individual country VARs which illustrate the impact of the 
different shocks that have affected public debt dynamics, Section 5 discusses the 
results and Section 6 concludes. 
 
 
2  Overview of the literature 
There are some authors, who have applied the so called debt dynamics identity 
which defines the change in the public debt level in terms of the real interest rate, 
output growth and the primary balance to calculate the exact contribution of these 
variables on the evolution of public debts (eg Shigehara, 1995, and Hallett and  
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Lewis, 2004). The problem, however, with this approach is that identities as such 
do not reveal the underlying economic relationships and conclusions based on 
them can be misleading. Examples of studies which have tried to quantify the 
impact of monetary and fiscal policy on macroeconomic variables like output, 
inflation and the interest rates using the VAR methodology are Blanchard and 
Perotti (2002), Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (1999), Fatas and Mihov 
(2002), Melitz (1995) and Moutford and Uhlig (2002). Furthermore, an increasing 
number of authors have started to model monetary and fiscal policy effects jointly 
in a VAR context (eg Favero, 2002, Marcellino, 2006). Yet, there are relatively 
few studies which have used the VARs in analysing public debt dynamics 
(Giannitsarou and Scott, 2006, Reade and Stehn, 2006). 
  Giannitsarou and Scott applied a log linearised version of the inter-temporal 
budget constraint to answer three questions: is current fiscal policy in OECD 
economies sustainable; how OECD governments have financed fiscal deficits in 
recent decades and; what implications rising deficits have for inflation. They 
found that, against historical background, fiscal policy is sustainable with the 
possible exception of Japan; major part of fiscal consolidation has come from 
changes in the primary balance with only a minor role for inflation, interest rates 
and growth – ie a result which is in a stark contrast with ours – and; fiscal 
imbalances had only a very weak role in forecasting future inflation. 
  Reade and Stehn apply the cointegrated VAR method to study the interaction 
of monetary and fiscal policy and its effect on the sustainability of public debt 
developments in the US in 1960–2005. They conclude that fiscal policy has 
ensured long-run debt sustainability by responding to the increase in debt in a 
stabilising way though the feedback has been moderate. However, according to 
their findings, discretionary fiscal policy has not ensured counter-cyclical 
behaviour. Moreover, monetary policy has followed a Taylor type rule and 
corrected disequilibrium both in the short and in the long run. 
  Melitz (1995) analyses the effect of monetary and fiscal policy on the public 
debt and deficits in 19 OECD countries from 1960/78 to 1995 using pooled data. 
He achieves several interesting results: First, fiscal policy reacts to the ratio of 
public debt in a stabilising manner as in our case. Second, loose fiscal policy leads 
to tight monetary policy and vice versa. Third, automatic stabilisation of fiscal 
policy is much weaker than generally perceived. Expansion raises tax receipts but 
also government expenditures. 
  Polito and Wickens (2005) examine the sustainability of fiscal policy of the 
US, the UK, and Germany over the last 25 years and carry out counter-factual 
experiments of the likely consequences on fiscal sustainability of using a Taylor 
rule to set monetary policy over this period. Among their findings is that the 
recent fiscal stance of the three countries is not sustainable, and that using a 
Taylor rule in the past would have improved the fiscal performance of the US and 
the UK, but not that of Germany. Polito and Wickens use a VAR including  
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monetary policy and fiscal variables, as well as the deficit and debt ratios. 
  Marcellino (2006) studies the effects of non-systematic fiscal policy on 
macroeconomic variables in the euro area in a VAR also including both monetary 
policy and fiscal variables, but his focus is not strictly on debt dynamics, although 
the debt ratio is included in some simulations. Marcellino concludes that the 
systematic component of fiscal policy, which he defines as the impact of 
automatic stabilisers and budget plans, explains major part of the fiscal policy 
effects. Adding the public debt ratio in his basic VAR doesn’t affect the results. 
  Benjamin Friedman (2006) analyses the persistence of the effects of fiscal 
shocks on deficit and debt developments in the US from 1960 to 2004 in four and 
five variable VAR models including GDP growth, inflation, public expenditure or 
revenue items or the actual deficit, and the debt to GDP ratio. He identifies the 
size and persistence of fiscal shocks to the evolution of debt and deficit ratios and 
finds a high persistence in the responses as in the present study. 
 
 
3  The variables and the econometric methodology 
3.1 The  VAR 
The discussion on the evolution and sustainability of public debt developments 
often starts with the definition of the government budget constraint 
 
) G T ( rB B B t t 1 t 1 t t − − = − − −  (3.1) 
 
where  1 t B −  is general government debt at the end of year t-1, r is the real interest 
rate, Tt is total general government revenue during year t, and Gt is total general 
government expenditure during year t excluding interest payments on the debt. 
Normally the budget constraint is written in a form that expresses the evolution of 
the debt to GDP ratio in terms of the difference between the real interest rate and 
the output growth rate, and the ratio of the primary deficit to GDP 
 
) g t ( b ) y i ( b b t t 1 t t t t 1 t t − − − π − = − − −  (3.2) 
 
where b is the general government debt to GDP ratio, i is the nominal interest rate 
on general government debt, π is inflation, y is the real GDP growth rate; t is the 
share of public revenues in GDP and g is the share of government spending in 
GDP excluding interest payments on debt. Equation (3.2) which is an identity is 
also called the debt dynamics equation. According to this equation, a robust GDP 
growth and low real interest rates are vital in restraining the growth of public  
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debts. Furthermore, the current fiscal position of the public sector, as measured by 
the primary balance, is a significant contributor. In fact, since monetary and fiscal 
authorities have less control over real interest rates and the growth rate of the 
economy, the primary balance is an important fiscal policy variable in the 
equation. 
  The variables most commonly included in a standard monetary policy VAR 
are some measure of output, inflation and the interest rate, implying that the 
central bank follows a sort of Taylor rule in the conduct of monetary policy.
1 The 
two other relationships in these now standard three equation models are the IS-
Curve and the Phillips Curve. Instead, a standard fiscal policy VAR includes 
typically government revenue and expenditure and a measure of output. Since the 
debt dynamics equation contains, by definition, all these variables, we believe that 
by including the variables of the equation in our basic reduced form VAR model 
we can capture the interaction of monetary and fiscal policy in a VAR setting and, 
consequently, provide a rich macroeconomic framework for the study of public 
debt developments. However, since we are particularly interested in the relative 
importance of monetary and fiscal policy on debt dynamics, we replace the 
effective interest rate on general government debt – which is the relevant nominal 
interest rate in the debt equation – with an interest rate which is either the exact 
target rate of the monetary authorities or a close substitute for it. Figure 3.1 below 
provides evidence of the connection of the short term interest rate and the 
effective interest rate on government debt to justify this choice.
2 
 
                                                 
1 More sophisticated models often include some measure(s) of central bank reserves and a 
monetary aggregate. 
2 A proxy for the effective interest rate on government debt is achieved by dividing the general 
government interest payments to GDP ratio by the general government debt to GDP ratio.  
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Figure 3.1  Three month market interest rate (IS) and the 
      interest on general government debt (IB) in 























































Our choice of output growth instead of the output gap deviates from the standard 
practise of using the difference between output and potential output in monetary 
and fiscal policy VARs. Moreover, our version of the debt dynamics equation 
expresses the public debt, expenditures and revenues as shares of the GDP. This 
complicates the interpretation of the impulse response functions of the standard 
VAR analysis compared, for example, to using logarithmic levels of these 
variables. The main motivation for our choice is the fact that the rules of the 
Stability and Growth Pact for the critical levels of public debt and deficits are  
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expressed as ratios to the GDP. Consequently, as we are also interested in 
assessing the reactions of these variables to economic, monetary and fiscal policy 
shocks, we use the same definitions as in the Pact. 
  One intricate question regarding the VAR method is the interpretation given 
to the error terms of the equations. Ideally, they could be seen as providing 
information on deviations from policy rules, because it is thought that only when 
policy makers deviate from their rules, it becomes possible to collect interesting 
information on the response of macroeconomic variables to monetary and fiscal 
policy impulses (eg Bagliano and Favero, 1998). The problem with this 
interpretation is that the residuals of the equations are often correlated with each 
other and therefore it is difficult to attach them to particular monetary or fiscal 
policy actions. Consequently, to isolate shocks to one of the variables in the 
system it is necessary to decompose the residuals in such a way that they become 
orthogonal. One convenient, but also criticised way to do this is to apply the 
Choleski decomposition in the identification of the shocks.
3 The identifying 
assumption is that the variable that comes earlier in the ordering affects the 
following variable contemporaneously, as well as with lags, while the variables 
that come later affect the previous variables only with lags. Despite its caveats, we 
believe that the Cholesky decomposition can to a certain extent be justified on 
economic grounds in our case, in other words, we believe that the structural 
relationships of the included endogenous variables are recursive. Namely; first, a 
common way to separate a policy shock from non-policy shocks is to assume that 
policy shocks do not have a contemporaneous effect on inflation and output 
(Favero 2002). According to this assumption, output and inflation are ordered 
before the interest rate and the fiscal variables. Second, it is often assumed that 
monetary policy affects macroeconomic variables, including the fiscal variables, 
with a lag. This suggests that fiscal variables should come before the interest rate. 
Third, putting the debt to GDP ratio last is justified by the debt dynamics equation 
which specifies a contemporaneous effect of the other variables on the debt to 
GDP ratio. Thus, if this reasoning is relevant, the only ambiguous choice is what 
is the mutual ordering of output and inflation. However, as this choice only affects 
the relative importance of these two variables, we can try both orderings. Finally, 
especially the impulse responses functions of our basic VAR model seem to be 
almost invariant to different orderings. This downplays somewhat the importance 
of this matter. 
  Looking at the ordering of the variables in the studies we have mentioned, 
Favero (2002) and Favero and Marcellino (2005) use the ordering: inflation, 
output gap, short term interest rate and expenditure and revenue shares (and debt 
                                                 
3 For example, Bernanke (1986) maintains that the Cholesky decomposition is equivalent to 
assuming that the structural model for the residuals is of a particular form, ie strictly recursive –
which is usually not motivated by the relevant economic theory. For an assessment of different 
techniques used to tackle this problem, see eg Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (1998).  
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to GDP ratio in Favero, 2002). Favero (2006) has the ordering: total revenue, total 
expenses, output gap, inflation and interest rate. B. Friedman (2006) uses four and 
five variable VARs including GDP growth, inflation, public expenditure and 
revenue items or the actual deficit as share of the GDP, and the debt to GDP ratio, 
in this order (Friedman does not include the interest rate). Perotti’s (2002) 
benchmark VAR includes expenditure and revenue shares, output growth, 
inflation and interest rate. Also Blanchard and Perotti (2002) put fiscal policy 
variables first when investigating specifically the effects of fiscal policy on output 
growth. Furthermore, many authors add structural inferences and identification 
schemes to overcome the ambiguities of the Cholesky ordering. 
  Our empirical results are based on a basic recursive, reduced form VAR-





t i t i t 0 D X A X A ε + Φ + =∑
=
−  (3.3) 
 
where k denotes the lag-order of the model, Dt is a vector of deterministic terms 
and  εt ~ Np(0,Ω) is a vector of mutually uncorrelated innovations. The yearly 
VAR includes one lag while the quarterly VAR displayed in Appendix 1 includes 
four lags. In the first specification, Xt denotes a vector which contains the 
variables in the order Xt = (yt, πt, pribalt, ist, bt), comprising the GDP growth rate 
yt, the change in the Consumer Price Index πt, the general government primary 
balance as a share of GDP pribalt, the three month money market interest rate ist 
and the general government gross financial liabilities as a share of GDP bt. In the 
second specification we replace the primary balance by its components, total 
public expenditure gt, and total public revenue tt, as shares of GDP so that in the 
second specification Xt = (yt, πt, gt, tt, ist, bt). 
  The coefficients of the A0 matrix reflect contemporaneous relationships 
among the variables Xt. We assume that A0 is a lower triangular matrix which is 
equivalent to estimating a reduced form VAR model and computing the Cholesky 
factorization of the VAR covariance matrix (Stock and Watson, 2001, Corsetti 
and Muller, 2006). Once the VAR is estimated, we generate impulse response 
functions and variance decompositions of the reduced form. 
 
 
3.2 The  data 
One complicating factor in the empirical analysis of fiscal policy is the small 
number of observations which is due to the low frequency of fiscal data. This is 
related to the fact that the budget is set for the fiscal year. While discretionary 
reactions to business cycle movements or other shocks could be taken within the  
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year, the long implementation lags involved imply that the number and 
importance of such decisions is often limited. The yearly frequency is particularly 
problematic for the recursiveness assumption discussed above since it is more 
difficult to justify the assumption that there would be no contemporaneous 
interaction between the relevant variables within a year than within a quarter. 
However, the low frequency may also bring some advantages; there is less need 
for the correction of seasonal effects or the impact of outliers. Moreover, the 
quality of quarterly fiscal data, which is available for a limited number of OECD-
countries, is not always clear (Beetsma, Giuliodori and Klaassen, 2006). We 
assess the importance of this problem in Appendix 1 by comparing the results of 
our basic VAR achieved by both yearly and quarterly data for the US and 
Germany. The conclusion we draw from this comparison is that, in spite of the 
low frequency, the results obtained by the yearly data are quite similar with the 
results obtained by using quarterly data. Therefore we believe that the low 
frequency of our data will not pose a major problem for the analysis and, anyway, 
in the majority of cases, only yearly data is available. 
  The OECD economic outlook 2006 data base provides yearly fiscal data on 
pubic debt, revenue, expenditure and primary balance for 20 countries and 
quarterly data for 9 countries.
4 However, the length of both yearly and quarterly 
time series differs widely. We have restricted our analysis to those OECD 
economies for which the yearly data starts at latest in 1978. There are 13 such 
countries: Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Spain, Greece, France, Italy, Austria, 
Finland, the UK, the US, Japan and Canada. The data sources are the OECD, the 
European Commission, and the IMF. The quarterly federal funds rate is from the 
IMF data base and the debt to GDP ratio of the EU countries is from the European 
Commission. All other data are from the OECD. We use the European 
Commission definition of the general government debt to GDP ratio since this is 
the official yardstick used for measuring the compliance with the Stability and 
Growth Pact. As this measure is available only for the EU countries, we have used 
the OECD definition for the US, Japan and Canada. 
  Time series of our main variables and some related series are displayed in 
Figures 3.2 through 3.4 below. We have aggregated the euro area 12 and 
compared it with the US time series to stress the striking similarities of public 
debt dynamics in both continents. Moreover, the time series illustrate well the 
overall behaviour of monetary and fiscal variables in most OECD economies in 
 
                                                 
4 Belgium, Germany, Spain, Greece, France, Italy, Austria, the Netherlands and Finland.  
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1960–2005.
5 As regards the statistical properties of the time series, according to 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller tests, the GDP growth rate is an I(0) process in all 
OECD-countries of our sample. The inflation rate and short term nominal money 
market interest rate are I(1) processes with only one borderline case.
6 The primary 
balance to GDP ratio is an I(1) process in the majority of the countries in our 
sample while it is an I(0) in the US, the UK, Germany, Denmark and Finland. 
Finally, the debt to GDP ratio is an I(1) process in eight of the sample economies, 
while it is an I(2) process in Belgium, Denmark, Spain, Japan and Canada. The 
inflation rate and the short term nominal money market interest rate show a 
‘humped’ shaped pattern with a peak at the end of the 1970s and at the beginning 
of the 1980s. The hump illustrates the consequences of escalating inflation rates 
since the late 1960s and the strong monetary policy reaction against this 
development in the beginning of the 1980s. 
 
Figure 3.2  GDP growth rate and inflation: 
      the euro area and the US, 1960–2005 
 
















                                                 
5 The public debt history of Finland, the UK and Japan differ from this general picture (see Figure 
3.5 in Appendix 3). The UK has had a declining trend in its debt to GDP ratio until the beginning 
of the 1990s; in Finland severe public debt problems emerged only for a short period in the 1990s 
because of a deep recession, and in Japan the collapse of the ‘bubble economy’ has aggravated 
greatly debt problems. The VAR results of these three countries, to which we refer to as countries 
with ‘peculiar debt histories’ often differ from the others and sometimes distort the scale of 
comparisons. 
6 According to the ADF-test, the short term money market interest rate is I(0) in Germany with the 
95% significance level but I(1) according to the Phillips-Peron test. A critical discussion on the 
relevance of using unit root tests, see, for example, Maddala and King (1998).  
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Figure 3.3  3-month nominal money market interest rate and 
      the long-term real interest rate: 
      the euro area and the US, 1960–2005 
 

















Perhaps the most dramatic change occurs in real long-term interest rates in the 
beginning of the 1980s, particularly in the US. Real interest rates had been at 
historically low levels all over the world in the high inflation years of the 1970s. 
However, there was an abrupt shift in the monetary policy emphasis between 
1979 and 1980 in most OECD economies.
7 The hikes in long real rates ranged 
from 11 per cent in the UK in 1981 and 1982 to about three to four per cent in 
Germany (which meant doubling of the real rates in Germany). 
 
                                                 
7 According to Goodfriend (1995), in the US, ‘the announcement (by the new Fed Chairman Paul 
Volcker) on 6 October 1979 of the switch to non-borrowed reserve targeting officially opened the 
period of disinflation policy’ (see also, for example, Huizinga and Mishkin, 1986, regarding the 
US and Bagliano, Golinelli and Morana 2002, regarding Europe).  
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Figure 3.4  The general primary balance, actual balance, 
      revenue and expenditure (excl. interest payments) 
      and the debt: the euro area and the US, 1960–2005 
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As regards the behaviour of the fiscal variables shown in the Figure 3.4, there are 
again striking similarities between the development in the US and the euro area. 
The primary balances fluctuated around zero over the cycle until the severe 
recession of 1975 (not visible in the shorter euro area series). In that year the 
primary deficits hit a record of minus four per cent of GDP both in the US and the 
euro area as a whole. There was a pursuit for an immediate consolidation in 1976 
to 1979, but the second oil shock in 1979, the sharp increase in monetary policy 
rates and the ensuing deep recession marked a new deterioration in fiscal balances 
(OECD EO, 1981). Primary deficits were brought close to balance in the majority 
of OECD countries in the latter half of the 1980s, but because of the impact of the 
high and persistent real interest rates on the interest burden of the debt, actual 
deficits did not turn into surplus until in the turn of the millennium. 
  Perhaps the only outstanding dissimilarity between the US and the euro area 
regarding fiscal variables is the large difference in the shares of public sector 
revenues and expenditure in GDP: in the euro area they are about 15 percentage 
points higher than in the US. Therefore, it is remarkable how similar the overall 
development of the fiscal variables is in both continents. In the US the significant 
increase in the debt to GDP ratio occurred in about ten years from 1982 to 1993  
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while in Europe the period was a few years longer. While many OECD countries, 
particularly the smaller ones, have got their debt to GDP ratio under control since 
the mid 1990s, the fiscal situation in the large euro area economies and the US is 
still worrying. The development of the debt to GDP ratio in the thirteen OECD 
countries of our sample is presented in Appendix 3 together with dynamic 
forecasts estimated with the basic country VARs for the period 1998–2005. 
 
 
4  The results of the recursive basic VAR model 
4.1  The response of the debt to GDP ratio to innovations 
in the VAR variables 
First of all, all country VARs are stable in the period under consideration.
8 In 
Figure A2.1 in Appendix 2 we display the impulse response functions based on 
yearly data of all countries of our sample.
9 The overall picture is that the sign and 
in most cases also the profile of the impulse responses are rather similar across 
countries while the magnitude of the responses differ from country to country. 
First, an unexpected positive shock to output growth initially decreases the debt to 
GDP ratio in all cases as one would expect and in the large majority this reaction 
is also statistically significant (the response of Belgium is clearly an anomaly). In 
Denmark, Spain, France, Finland and Japan the response is rather strong 
compared to others while it is weak in Germany, Greece, Italy and Austria. The 
UK, the US and Canada may be classified as intermediate cases. Second, as 
regards the influence of unexpected shocks to inflation, it is in most cases weak 
and almost in all cases statistically insignificant. In half of the cases (Denmark, 
Germany, Greece, Austria, the UK and the US) the accumulated impact is positive 
and in the other half negative (in Italy it is zero). The negative responses are 
dominated by two high debt countries, Belgium and Japan. It is interesting to find 
out that in half of the cases an unexpected inflation shock increases the debt to 
GDP ratio. Namely, it is often thought that high inflation erodes the value of debt 
and is therefore often regarded as the ultimate contingency solution to debt crises. 
The likely reason for this result is that higher inflation leads to higher interest 
rates and, consequently, to larger interest payments on the debt. 
  Concerning the impact of a positive innovation to the primary balance, in 12 
cases the accumulated impact on the debt ratio is negative while it is slightly 
positive only in Finland. The response is strongest in Japan and above average 
                                                 
8 If we had chosen another period, say, from 1970s to the end of 1980s, several country VARs 
would have been unstable. 
9 All shocks have been standardised by dividing them by the standard error of the equation of the 
variable. Accordingly, one standard deviation shock in the present context is always unity.  
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also in Belgium, Greece, France and Austria. The impact of unexpected fiscal 
policy shocks is weak in Denmark, Italy and the UK while Germany, the US and 
Canada are intermediate cases. An unexpected rise in the short term interest rate 
increases the debt ratio in 11 cases of 13 and in about half of the cases the 
response is statistically significant. The accumulated response is very large in 
Belgium and higher than average also in Denmark, Italy, Finland and Canada. The 
response is clearly weaker only in Greece and Austria. In the UK and Japan, the 
accumulated response is negative but not statistically significant. In the case of 
Japan, the ‘wrong’ sign is probably due to the fact that there has at the same time 
been a strong trend decrease in the short term interest rates while the debt ratio 
has increased from 23 per cent to 134 per cent. Finally, the positive response of 
the debt ratio to a shock to itself is quite weak, though in most cases statistically 
significant. 
  All in all, shocks to output growth, the primary balance and the short term 
interest rate have the strongest and in accumulated terms almost equally strong 
influence on the debt to GDP ratio while shocks to inflation and the debt ratio 
itself have only a minor impact. In the great majority of cases the signs of the 
responses are as expected, but the responses of countries with peculiar debt 
histories often deviate from the common pattern. Regarding the persistence of the 
impact of the shocks to the debt to GDP ratio, in the large majority of cases the 
persistence is remarkably high. The responses are particularly large and persistent 
in the two high debt economies Belgium and Japan, while they are smaller but as 
persistent in Greece. Instead, in the fourth high debt country Italy the impulse 
responses are on average small and not particularly persistent compared to others. 
In Denmark, Spain, Finland and the UK the responses seem to die out sooner than 
on average. Finally, on average, shocks to output growth and inflation are less 
persistent than the policy shocks. 
 
 
4.2 The  variance  decompositions of the shocks 
Table 4.1 displays the variance decompositions of the debt to GDP ratio for all 
countries of our sample. The Table shows the decomposition in one and ten year 
horizons to highlight potential differences in the short and long run impact. 
Moreover, in the last two columns of the Table we show the results of a variant of 
our basic VAR in which we have replaced the primary balance with its 
components, total public expenditure and revenue. 
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Table 4.1  Variance decomposition of the debt to GDP ratio 
      in selected OECD-countries in 1960–2005; one and 
      10 year horizons (percentage points) 
 
 S.E. Y  INFL PRIBAL IS B EXPEN  REV 
BE  1  year 1.5 7.9  31.7 10.2 2.3 48.0 4.5 8.1 
  10 year 1.9  2.6  13.9 10.2 71.7 1.7 26.0  3.9 
DK  1  year 1.1 51.8 11.3 2.6 9.9 24.4 0.1  1.4 
  10 year 1.5  42.0  13.3 6.7 33.9 4.1 3.6  3.1 
GE  1  year 1.6  48.3 2.4 14.0 0.3 35.0 5.1 9.7 
  10 year 1.9  17.8  9.0 35.1 18.4 19.7 23.5  10.2 
SP  1  year 1.0  34.0 5.4 17.5 12.1 31.1 16.6 7.0 
  10 year 1.5  29.2  5.2 8.7 49.0 8.0 26.5  9.0 
GR  1  year 2.2 5.7 1.2 17.6 0.0 75.6 9.3 0.6 
  10 year 3.5  2.3  8.7 59.5 4.4 25.1 23.5  10.2 
FR  1  year 1.1 23.6  0.1 37.9 4.7 32.6 27.1 18.9 
  10 year 1.3  42.1  1.9 13.2 33.0 9.8 17.2  6.2 
IT  1  year 1.7  26.4 5.6 1.2 2.5 64.3 0.0 2.2 
  10 year 1.9  8.2  1.7 4.5 65.5 20.1 23.9  3.8 
AT  1  year 2.1  32.8 6.7 9.3 0.3 51.0 23.6 8.9 
  10 year 1.9  9.8  6.7 46.6 12.5 24.5 46.1  14.1 
FI  1  year 2.1 32.8  6.7 9.3 0.3 51.0 0.9 13.8 
  10 year 3.1  57.7  1.5 3.2 30.1 7.6 5.3  28.4 
UK  1  year 1.6 2.9 0.2 0.0 11.7 85.2 17.8  20.7 
  10 year 2.3  37.0  4.3 29.7 4.5 24.5 15.9  29.3 
US  1  year 1.7 52.3  9.4 22.4 0.2 15.6 10.0 16.8 
  10 year 2.2  39.9  6.4 21.2 26.6 5.9 13.8  5.7 
JP  1  year 1.6 35.0 14.7 6.7 0.6 43.0 2.8  4.0 
  10 year 1.8  62.0  12.4 11.2 12.2 2.1 1.2  12.2 
CA  1  year 1.6 24.3 18.6 12.9 0.1 44.1 23.9  0.0 
  10 year 2.3  7.6  3.0 6.6 69.7 13.2 15.8  25.0 
Aver  1  year 1.6  28.1 8.7 14.4 3.5 45.3 10.9 8.6 
  10 year 2.1  27.6  6.4 20.1 33.3 12.7 18.6  12.4 
 
 
In general, the results of the variance decompositions are in accordance with what 
we have learned from the impulse response functions in that output growth, the 
primary balance and the short term interest rates are the most important factors 
affecting the debt to GDP ratio forecasting errors, particularly in the longer term. 
Shocks to output growth explain, on average, about 28 per cent, to inflation 
around 6.5 per cent, to the primary balance about 20 per cent, to the short term 
interest rate about 33 per cent and to the debt ratio itself about 13 per cent of the 
debt to GDP ratio forecast error variation in the ten year horizon. However, 
especially the relative weights of shocks to output growth and the primary balance 
vary widely from country to country. Instead, monetary policy shocks explain 
consistently a large share in the forecast error variance in the large majority of the 
cases (the impact is week in Greece and the UK).  
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  The short and long term results deviate from each other mainly in that the 
short term interest rate exerts virtually no impact on the variance decomposition in 
the short run while shocks to the debt ratio itself explain about half of the 
forecasting error in one year horizon. However, the interest rate impact increases 
gradually by time and exerts the strongest effect among the VAR variables in the 
long run. The share of output growth is, on average, almost similar in both short 
and long term horizon. However, in most countries the impact of output is strong 
in the short run and then decreases gradually. This is clearly the case in Belgium, 
Germany, Italy, Austria and Canada. In contrast, in countries with peculiar debt 
histories and in France the impact of output growth increases over time. On 
average, the long term share of the primary balance in the variance decomposition 
is larger than in the short run but, again, the role of fiscal shocks differ widely 
from country to country. 
  As regards the large variance in the relative importance of output and primary 
balance shocks, one could perhaps conclude that in those countries where output 
shocks explain a smaller than average share of the forecast error in the long run 
(Germany, Greece and Austria), the primary balance explains larger than average 
share and vice versa (Denmark, France, Finland and Japan). In addition, the share 
of output in the variance decomposition is small and the share of shocks to the 
short term interest rate very high in countries with high public debts (Belgium, 
Italy and Canada). The fact that in Finland and Japan the share of shocks to output 
growth have a large share in the debt to GDP ratio variance decomposition is in 
accordance with the large drop in output in Finland in the beginning of 1990s and 
the sluggish growth performance of Japan also from the start of the 1990s. 
Furthermore, in the euro area countries, policy shocks seem to play a larger role in 
public debt developments than in the other countries while in the latter shocks to 
GDP growth play, on average, a larger role (except in Canada). 
  To attain information of the relative roles of public expenditure and revenue 
in public debt developments, we replaced the primary balance with total general 
government expenditure and revenue in our basic VAR model. The shares of 
these two components in the variance decomposition of the modified VAR are 
shown in the last two columns of Table 4.1.
10 Shocks to expenditures have a 
larger influence in the variance decomposition than shocks to revenues which is in 
accordance with the common finding that fiscal consolidation measures that seek 
to restrain expenditure developments are more efficient than actions on the 
revenue side. This would also be visible in the impulse response functions (not 
shown) where a negative shock to expenditure has an unambiguous and often 
statistically significant decreasing effect on the debt to GDP ratio while a shock to 
                                                 
10 On average, the share of shocks to output, inflation and the debt ratio itself (not shown in Table 
4.1) in the second VAR are close to those displayed in Table 4.1. However, the sum of the shares 
of shocks to expenditure and revenue in this second variance decomposition, about 30 per cent, is 
larger than the share of shocks to the primary balance of about 20 per cent in the basic VAR.  
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public revenue has more often an ambiguous effect and is in most cases 
statistically insignificant. Shocks to public expenditure have the largest share in 
the variance decomposition in Germany, Greece and Austria. Finally, the share of 
revenue is larger than expenditure in the three countries with peculiar debt 
histories, Finland, UK and Japan and, furthermore, in Canada. 
 
 
4.3  The role of monetary and fiscal policy in public debt 
developments 
What has become obvious from the above is that unexpected shocks to monetary 
and fiscal policy have played an important role in public debt developments in our 
sample countries. Together they explain, on average, more than half of the 
forecast error variation in the debt to GDP ratio, and the response of the debt ratio 
to these policy shocks shows considerable persistence resulting in large 
accumulated effects. As regards the role of fiscal policy, it may be difficult to 
point out any specific unforeseen economic or policy shocks that would have 
triggered the overall deterioration in fiscal balances other than the deep recession 
in the mid-1970s after the first oil crises, and the accommodative stance of both 
fiscal and monetary policy during the recession. Many authors see the fiscal 
problems as a consequence of the building up of welfare states during the 1960s 
and 1970s. This strongly increased the share of public expenditures in GDP in 
several OECD economies (Rubini and Sachs, 1989, Masson and Mussa, 1989). 
However, the large increase in public indebtedness seems to be largely 
independent of the share of public sector in the economy. Nevertheless, the build 
up of welfare states do play a role in public debt developments as it has been 
difficult to adjust the existing welfare schemes to changing economic 
circumstances. Moreover, it took quite long before even professional economists 
realised that the high output growth rates which prevailed in OECD economies 
until the beginning of the 1970s did not re-emerge soon. Because of – by 
hindsight – unrealistically optimistic economic forecasts fiscal targets were 
constantly undershot in the late 1970s and early 1980s. 
  As regards the role of unexpected monetary policy shocks in public debt 
developments, it is easier to date the largely unexpected and in economic terms 
quite dramatic change in the monetary policy regime that happened in the 
beginning of the 1980s. In the US the quarterly nominal federal funds rate 
increased from 9.8 per cent in the third quarter to 15.9 per cent in the fourth 
quarter of 1980 while in many European countries the increase in nominal short 
term interest rates was even larger than in the US. From the second panel of 
Figure 3.3 (p. 17) we saw that this resulted in a sudden unexpected increase of 
several percentage points in the real long term interest rates in the US in the  
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beginning of 1980. This implied that – just to keep the debt to GDP ratio constant 
– there should have been a marked increase in the primary balance to GDP ratio. 
However, at the same time as real interest rates reached high levels, the output 
growth rates declined. There had been a commitment to lower government deficits 
already before the second oil shock in 1979, but high interest rates, indexation 
commitments and unemployment related expenditures made it difficult to meet 
borrowing targets (OECD EO, Dec. 1981). Mervin King described this dilemma 
vividly in the Federal Reserve Jackson Hole Conference in 1995 (King, 1995); 
 
  ‘One consequence of this change in monetary policy is that the attempt to 
bring inflation down – resulting in lower inflation than expected – led to a 
fiscal problem. A shift to a regime with a lower inflation rate but one in which 
the new policy does not have total credibility immediately raises the effective 
real interest rate on government debt. This creates a need for extra revenue to 
finance the higher debt-financing costs incurred in the transitional period 
during which credibility is being established … A successful policy of 
disinflation slows the growth of nominal GDP, but does not reduce the 
required interest payments on conventional debt until the new policy acquires 
credibility. Expected inflation will decline more slowly than inflation (King, 
1995, 176–177)’. 
 
Consequently, the credibility of the new monetary policy regime posed a new 
problem both to monetary and fiscal authorities. King coined this dilemma ‘Some 
unpleasant fiscal arithmetic’ in corollary to the famous Sargent-Wallace’s 
argument on ‘Some unpleasant monetarist arithmetic’ (Sargent and Wallace, 
1981). 
  Did fiscal policy – in terms of an increase in the primary balance – react 
according to this ‘arithmetic’ in the 1980s? As figure 4.2 of selected OECD 
countries show, there has been a significant increase in the share of interest 
payments in GDP which started in the mid 1970s and got a strong boost in the 
beginning of the 1980s. According to Figure 4.2, there has been a gradual 
correction in the primary balance in Belgium, Germany and Italy but the reaction 
was delayed and, as the different scales of the left and right axes of the Figure 4.2 
reveal, the increase in interest payments evidently surpassed the increase in the 
primary balance. This delayed reaction explains a major part of the rise in the debt 
to GDP ratio particularly in the high debt countries. Figure 4.2 also shows the 
importance of the marked decrease in real interest rates after the mid 1990s for the 
decline of the interest burden on public debts. 
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Figure 4.2  Share of net interest payments (left scale) and the 
      primary balance (right scale) in GDP, 1960–2004 
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To find more evidence of the response of fiscal policy to a deterioration of the 
debt ratio, we display in Figure 4.3 the response of the primary balance to a 
positive innovation in the debt to GDP ratio in our sample economies. In eight 
cases of 13 there is an immediate, albeit small, positive response of the primary 
balance. In five of these the reaction is also statistically significant. In all cases the 
accumulated response is positive.
11 In Belgium, Denmark, Spain, Greece, Italy 
and Canada, of which most still are or have been high debt economies, the 
positive response is somewhat larger than average while it is close to zero in 
Germany, France and Austria, of which the first two have had difficulties in 
stabilising their debt to GDP ratios. The positive reaction is also small in Japan 
while the US is an intermediate case. In Finland and the UK – both countries with 
peculiar public debt histories – the profile of the reaction is different from the rest 
and the accumulated response is close to zero. 
                                                 
11 Bohn (1998) argues that a strictly positive and at least linear response of the primary balance to 
changes in the debt to GDP ratio is a sufficient condition for debt sustainability, regardless of how 
interest rates and growth rates compare (p. 960–961). Since his analytical framework is different 
from ours, we are not sure if his reasoning applies here.  
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Figure 4.3  Response of the primary balance to a positive 
      shock in the debt to GDP ratio, yearly data 
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There has been a lively debate of the potential non-Keynesian effects of fiscal 
policy among academic economists in recent years. In our basic VAR this would 
mean that a positive shock to the primary balance would have a positive effect on 
output. Figure 4.4 shows the reaction of output growth to an unexpected increase 
in the primary balance in our sample economies. While in nine cases the 
accumulated effect is negative, ie ‘Keynesian’, all in all, the responses are small 
and rarely statistically significant. In four cases the accumulated impact is positive 
(Germany, Greece, Austria and Japan) but in all these cases the reaction is not 
statistically significant. If we compare our results with those obtained from a  
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‘pure’ fiscal VAR including only output growth and the primary balance, the 
accumulated response of output growth to a fiscal policy shock is in most cases 
stronger than in our basic VAR. 
 
Figure 4.4  Response of output growth to a positive innovation 
      in the primary balance, yearly data 
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Concerning the responses of the other VAR variables to an unforeseen positive 
shock to the debt to GDP ratio, they are very small, although more consistent in 
that in the large majority of cases an unexpected shock to the debt to GDP ratio 
has a small negative impact on GDP growth, inflation and the short term interest 
rate. In less than half of the cases the response is statistically significant.  
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  Finally, the impulse response functions of our two reduced form VARs 
confirm some stylized facts which are typical for many VAR studies including 
either monetary or fiscal variables or both: first, in the vast majority of cases, a 
positive expenditure shock boosts output growth and a positive revenue shock 
discourages growth in the short run. While in most cases inflation declines after a 
positive shock to the interest rate, in some countries there is a notable ‘prize 
puzzle’, ie inflation initially increases after a hike in the short term interest rate 
before it starts to decline. In contrast, output responds negatively to a positive 
interest rate shock as one would expect. The short term interest rate responds 
positively to positive output and inflation shocks as the Taylor rule suggests and 





In Chapter 3 we discussed the justification of the assumption that the structural 
relationships of the VAR variables are to a certain extent recursive. In the 
following we look briefly into the sensitivity of our results to the chosen ordering 
of the variables. As regards the impulse response functions of the base model, 
they seem to be highly resistant to different orderings. When the unit responses 
are compared to non-Cholesky ordered unit responses, even their magnitudes are 
in many cases close to each other. However, the results of the variance 
decompositions are normally more sensitive to the ordering. Therefore, we discuss 
below some alternatives: As said, it is arguable whether one should order output 
before inflation, which is our choice, or the other way round. Nevertheless, as this 
has only minor effects on the relative importance of output and inflation, both 
orderings could be applied in our case.
12 A more intricate question is whether it is 
justified to have the short term interest rate after the fiscal variables: in most 
cases, the results would not change much, but in some countries the long term 
impact of the short term interest rate in the variance decomposition would decline 
significantly and the impact of fiscal policy would become more prominent. 
Finally, if the short term interest rate would be ordered last, its significance would 
increase further and at the same time the share of shocks to the debt ratio itself 
would become very small. This last ordering could be justified if the effective 
interest rate on public debt reacts with a lag to a change in the monetary policy 
rate. The small average share of 3.5 per cent of the short term interest rate in the 
first year variance decomposition of the debt ratio could be an indication of such 
delay (see also Figure 3.1). 
                                                 
12 The share of inflation shocks would increase slightly if inflation is ordered first.  
29 
  In the following we present a simplified, small ‘semi-structural’
13 model in 
the spirit of Favero (2002) and Favero and Marcellino (2005) of the potential 
structural relationships of the five endogenous variables of our basic VAR. The 
system includes the following five equations: 
 
t 1 1 t 3 1 t 1 t s 2 1 t 1 t pribal ) i ( y y ε + β + π − β + β = − − − −    IS-curve  (5.1) 
 
t 2 1 t 5 1 t 4 t y ε + β + π β = π − −  Phillips  curve  (5.2) 
 
t 3 1 t 8 1 t 7 1 t 6 t b y pribal pribal ε + β + β + β = − − −  Fiscal  rule  (5.3) 
 
t 4 1 t 11 1 t 10 ) 1 t ( s 9 st y i i ε + β + π β + β = − − −  Taylor  rule  (5.4) 
 
t 5 1 st 16 1 t 15 1 t 14 1 t 13 1 t 12 t i pribal y b b ε + β + β + π β + β + β = − − − − −  Debt  equation (5.5) 
 
The first equation is a sort of IS-curve including the real interest rate (implying 
that the Fisher-effect holds in the long run) and the primary balance while the 
second equation is a Phillips Curve in which output growth is used as an indicator 
for the overall level of activity instead of the more common unemployment or 
output gap. Equation (5.3) describes the response of the primary balance to output 
shocks and a potential systematic reaction of fiscal policy to an increase in the 
public debt burden. Equation (5.4) is a sort of backward looking Taylor rule, 
where the central bank reacts systematically to innovations in inflation and output. 
Finally, equation (5.5) is the debt equation of our basic VAR model. While it 
resembles the debt dynamics identity 3.2, it is important to note that it ignores the 
non-linear interaction terms between the level of the debt on the one hand, and the 
real interest rate and GDP growth rate on the other hand in the identity. There is 
no straightforward way to overcome this problem in a linear VAR setting.
14 
Moreover, there are other reasons why equation (5.5) should not match the actual 
debt evolution exactly: First, our choice to use the monetary policy rate as a proxy 
for the interest rate on general government debt causes some discrepancy (see 
Figure 3.1). Second, we have omitted seigniorage income from the debt identity 
because its role has decreased significantly, but it may have exerted some 
influence particularly in the 1970s in countries with high inflation. Finally, the 
debt identity ignores the role of the so called stock flow adjustment which in some 
countries causes a marked discrepancy between the public debt figures achieved 
by the debt identity and actual statistical data on public debt. 
                                                 
13 Favero and Marcellino use the term semi-structural to indicate that there are no forward looking 
variables. 
14 Giannitsarou and Scott (2006) give several references where this problem is discussed. See also 
Appendix 3.  
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  By exploring the coefficients of the Ai matrix of equation (3.3) of the 
individual country VARs we find that in ten cases out of 13 there exists a 
statistically significant positive relationship between output and inflation as the 
Phillips curve suggests. Also in ten cases out of 13 there exists a significant 
positive relationship between output and the short term interest rate as suggested 
by the Taylor rule, while only in four countries (Greece, Italy, the UK and the US) 
there was in addition a significant positive relationship between inflation and the 
short term interest rate, as also suggested by the Taylor rule (moreover, in six 
cases there was a positive but not statistically significant reaction). As regards the 
IS-curve and the ‘fiscal rule’, there is more variation. About the IS-curve, in six 
cases there was a statistically significant negative correlation of around -0.4 
between the primary balance and output. These were Belgium, Spain, Italy, 
Finland, the US and Canada. Moreover, in six cases there was a significant 
negative correlation between the nominal short term interest rate and output of the 
order -0.2 to -0.5. As regards the existence of a ‘fiscal rule’, in ten cases out of 13 
there was a systematic positive response of the primary balance to an increase in 
the debt to GDP ratio but only in four cases (Belgium, Denmark, Italy and the US) 
the coefficient was statistically significant. 
  As regards the debt equation, in 12 cases the coefficient of GDP growth was 
negative and in ten cases the coefficient was statistically significant. In four cases 
there was a statistically significant negative coefficient for inflation. The 
coefficient of the primary balance was negative in all cases but significant only in 
six cases. Finally, the coefficient of the short term interest rate was in all cases 
positive and statistically significant in 7 cases. As a conclusion, our basic VAR 
captures quite well some basic macroeconomic relationships typical for small 
macro economic models, although the coefficients – perhaps partly because of the 
limited number of observations – were not always statistically significant. 
  If the error terms of our basic VAR model would be uncorrelated – as they 
more or less were in the case of the quarterly data – their economic interpretation 
as policy shocks would become more straightforward. However, because the error 
terms show larger correlation in the yearly data, we are more dependent on the 
relevance of the Cholesky decomposition and, consequently, the interpretation of 
the error terms remain somewhat ambiguous without more specific structural 
identification schemes for the shocks. Therefore, an obvious extension of this 
study would be to aim at more structural identification of the monetary and fiscal 
policy shocks. Another natural extension would be to identify the co-integration 
relationships suggested by statistical tests and give them an economic 
interpretation. Hasko (2006) and Reade and Scott (2006) have followed 
(independently) this path and specified the co-integration relationships in the case 
of the US using quarterly data for the period 1960–2005. Both studies found two 
stable long-run relationships among the VAR variables which they interpreted as 
a sort of Taylor rule and a fiscal policy rule and which explained the sustainability  
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of the public debt developments in the US. Similar experiments could be done for 




One of the main conclusions of our study on public debt dynamics is that shocks 
to monetary and fiscal policy have played a major role in public debt 
developments since the mid 1970s. Together these shocks explained, on average, 
about half of the forecast error variation in the debt to GDP ratio in the ten year 
horizon while the share of the shocks to GDP growth was close to 30 per cent. 
Instead, shocks to inflation and the debt ratio itself played in most cases a minor 
role. However, the inflation shocks were vital in initiating the public debt 
problems as the increase in actual inflation and particularly the persistence of high 
inflation expectations in the 1980s led to a prolonged period of high real interest 
rates. This raised significantly the interest burden of public debts. Thus, the new 
monetary policy regimes of the early 1980s gave rise to ‘some unpleasant fiscal 
arithmetic’ which aggravated and prolonged debt problems. Nevertheless, 
monetary authorities had no choice but to attain control over the rapid inflation. 
An additional factor that contributed to the initial increase in public indebtedness 
was that both economists and politicians of the time were overly optimistic of the 
resurgence of the economic growth rates of the preceding decades which delayed 
the necessary adjustment to the slower growth phase. 
  The reaction of the debt ratio to both monetary and fiscal policy shocks has 
shown considerable persistence which partly explains the current high debt levels. 
Nevertheless, it seems that, according to the impulse response functions and the 
basic VAR equations, in most countries of our study fiscal policy has aimed at 
correcting the deteriorating fiscal balances by improving the primary balance, but 
the progress has in most cases been slow and delayed. It is difficult to say whether 
these corrective actions could partly explain the fact that all the country VARs are 
stable in the period under consideration. 
  While the large role of monetary policy shocks in debt developments has been 
quite uniform across the OECD economies, the longer term role of fiscal policy 
shocks and shocks to GDP growth differ among countries. However, it is difficult 
to distinguish any particular country profiles which could explain the differences. 
It is quite obvious that the debt development of countries with very high debt 
ratios like Italy and Belgium is very sensitive to interest rate shocks and at the 
same time, other shocks play a minor role. 
  Looking our results from a different perspective, we could also conclude that 
shocks to output growth, inflation and monetary policy explain together about two 
thirds of the forecast error variance in the public debt ratio while fiscal policy  
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shocks explain only about 20 per cent of it in the longer term horizon. Could this 
be seen as an indication of the limited power of fiscal policy in affecting public 
debt evolution? So far we have not discussed the consequences of our results for 
the fiscal framework of the EMU. The remarkable similarity of the overall 
evolution of public debts and deficits in both the US and the euro area, shown in 
Figure 3.4, may be the result of the large shocks to inflation, economic growth 
and monetary policy which have been more uniform across the OECD countries 
than shocks to fiscal policy. If this was the case, we should probably give more 
weight on the assessment of these ‘exogenous’ factors in the judgment of fiscal 
policy outcomes in the context of the Stability and Growth Pact. On the other 
hand, taking into account the success of the new monetary policy regimes in 
controlling price developments, it may be less likely that today’s economies 
would confront real interest rate shocks of the magnitude seen in the 1970s and 
1980s. That said, even lesser shocks than those seen in the mid seventies and early 
eighties could have detrimental effects on public finances, taken into account the 
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Comparison of the results from quarterly and yearly data: the 
US and Germany 
In this Appendix we compare the results of our basic VAR obtained by quarterly 
and yearly data in the case of the US and Germany. For the US the range of both 
yearly and quarterly data is 1960–2005. For Germany it is 1970–2005 because of 
the shorter range of the quarterly data. Figure A1 displays the response of the debt 
to GDP ratio in the US and Germany to a positive one unit shock
15 in the variables 
of the basic VAR. The quarterly impulse response functions are displayed on the 
first row and the yearly responses on the second row for each country. 
  In qualitative terms, the responses are rather similar in both quarterly and 
yearly data in both countries. In quantitative terms, the reaction of the debt to 
GDP ratio to shocks to output, inflation and the debt to GDP ratio itself in both 
countries, and to a shock in the primary balance in the US, are also quite similar. 
As regards an unexpected shock to the primary balance in Germany, and to the 
short term interest rate in both countries, the response is clearly larger in the 
quarterly data compared to that in the yearly data although the overall profile of 
the reaction is again rather similar. Furthermore, in the quarterly data the 
responses are in general somewhat less persistent than in the yearly data. Still, in 
most cases the difference is not that large: for example, as regards shocks to 
output growth, in the US the maximum response of -1.1 is achieved after 10 
quarters in the quarterly data and of -1.3 in the third year in the yearly data. For 
Germany the corresponding figures are -0.8 after six quarters in the quarterly data 
and also -0.8 after two years in the yearly data. 
  As regards the comparison of the results from the variance decompositions, in 
general there are more differences. For example, as regards the US, the weights of 
shocks to output and the short term interest rates are higher in the yearly data than 
in the quarterly data. Finally, concerning the correlation of the error terms of the 
equations, in the quarterly data the correlations are clearly smaller than in the 
yearly data. In the German case the quarterly cross-correlations are mainly of the 
order of 0.05 to 0.2 while in the US they are somewhat larger. All in all, the 
results of the two data sets with different frequencies seem to be quite consistent 
in the case of both the US and Germany. 
 
                                                 
15 All shocks have been standardised by dividing them by the standard error of the equation of the 











































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Dynamic forecasts of the debt to GDP ratio: 
Figure A3.1 below shows the dynamic forecasts of the debt to GDP ratio for the 
period 1998 – 2005 for the 13 OECD countries estimated by the individual 
country VARs.
16 The reason for making these forecasts was to find out whether 
the results would hint to any such non-linearity in the public debt dynamics which 
would clearly question the use of a linear approximation of the debt identity, ie 
the equation (5.5), in the basic VAR. 
  The forecasts seem to capture the actual debt developments with different 
degrees of precision. For some countries like Greece, Austria, the US and Japan 
the forecasts overestimate the degree of consolidation achieved for the forecast 
period while it underestimates it for Spain. For Japan this may be due to the 
special circumstances after the collapse of the ‘bubble economy’, and as regards 
the US, it may be due to the radical loosening of fiscal policy in the beginning of 
the 2000s. However, for the majority of countries the forecast mimics quite well 
actual developments in 1998–2005.
17 Our conclusion from this is that, indeed, 
equation 5.5 seems to be a feasible approximation of the debt dynamics equation. 
 
                                                 
16 The country VARs have been estimated from the first year there is data available for all 
variables until 1997. Using the estimated coefficients, dynamic forecasts have then been computed 
for the period 1998–2005. 
17 For some countries the debt dynamics ‘stabilise’ rather early, so that, for example, for Italy the 




Figure A3.1  Dynamic forecasts for the debt to GDP ratio 
      for the period 1998–2005: 
      actual (solid line), forecast (broken line) 
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